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In Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World: Beyond Tolerance, Ryan Muldoon 
offers a liberal and non-ideal alternative to public reason. Public reason is a standard 
by which moral and political rules, laws, and institutions can be assessed. It requires 
moral and political rules to be acceptable or accepted, justifiable or justified, to all 
those persons on whom such rules would be imposed. In its different versions the 
idea of public reason relies upon implicit or idealizing assumptions that disagree-
ment is not that deep. But our societies are increasingly more diverse than philos-
ophers of public reason tend to think, and we need theories that can deal with this 
diversity. This is Ryan Muldoon’s initial observation.  
 
Scepticism of the ways that public reason, especially in its Rawlsian vestiges, ad-
dresses the increasing diversity of contemporary liberal democratic regimes is not 
new. Both liberal thinkers and scholars, such as Chantal Mouffe and Iris Marion 
Young, with a more critical, if not radical, attitude towards public reason, have 
challenged some of the aspects defining the idea of a political conception of justice 
valid for all reasonable citizens who recognize the need for fair terms of cooperation, 
and who advance their interpretation of such terms according to the shared fund 
of values that inform a democratic society. 
 
We can find, with different expressions and motivations, a recurring motif of re-
proach for Rawls’s version of public reason. Namely, for the sake of normative 
cogency, people have argued Rawls idealizes the boundaries of the relevant political 
community, and, simultaneously, conceives what fills these boundaries and the 
ways moral agents convey their disagreement on moral issues, such as which reli-
gions are to be tolerated, cultural exemptions, and who has the right to vote.  
 
In the first chapters of this book, by stressing the observation that public reason’s 
diversity problem is ultimately “an account of how diverse individuals actually share 
the same political conception” (and why this is the case), Muldoon echoes these 
criticisms, while still remaining explicitly within a liberal paradigm (Introduction 
and chapter 1). In deliberation of the public-reason kind, he says, moral agents 
express their similarities, not their differences. 
 
Even if not original, Muldoon’s critical argument is persuasive. Like the authors 
of a series of other influential books in contemporary normative political theory 
(i.e. Landemore 2017), he borrows insights from Scott Page’s demonstration that 
groups of diverse problem solvers can out-perform groups of high-ability problem 
solvers (Page 2008). Diversity (i.e. many persons who approach the same problem 
with different backgrounds; persons who have different skills and cooperate to solve 
a problem; persons who hold different moral or religious doctrines and approach a 
collectively relevant issue), in other words, is epistemically beneficial. So far, this 
theorem has gained credit in epistemic arguments for democratic legitimacy. One 
of Muldoon’s merits is that he brings these ideas to the debate on social contract 
theory and diversity. 
 
Since modern liberal democratic societies are more diverse than standard social 
contract theory tends to think, the main claim of the book is that “if diversity is 
taken seriously, much of social contract theory is subject to revision” (115). Most 
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As I understand Muldoon’s position, he is making two related claims. The first is 
epistemic, if not fallibilistic. It is a rejection of the kind of unwarranted moral 
generalization that, in his view, is typical of public-reason liberalism. Muldoon 
argues that we tend to give moral agents too much epistemic credit. In present 
circumstances, moral agents do not have adequate information to make totally re-
liable moral judgments. Simultaneously, he warns us against false universalisms. 
Muldoon thinks there is no epistemic grounding for a uniquely correct set of reg-
ulative ideals. Individuals, he says, reason in different ways and do not have the 
same access to information. It is therefore difficult to identify a priori standards, 
such as deontological moral imperatives with a universal scope, which can be com-
pelling for all those subject to them. 
 
The second claim is normative. Diversity, Muldoon says, is not only an empirical 
fact but something we should celebrate and encourage as a normative commitment. 
Moreover, just as there is no single best life-plan for all citizens, Muldoon argues 
we have no reason to believe there is a single best social contract for all societies. 
Any attempt to contain moral disagreement within a priori moral predicates, which 
regulate society once and for all, would affect the potential benefits stemming from 
the opportunity of living in a diverse community. For this reason, the ambition of 
social contract theory for a diverse world should be to motivate each society to 
rethink which social contracts are appropriate and to discover new ones. 
 
In this vein, Muldoon (chapter 2) rehabilitates Mill’s idea that we learn about the 
good through “experiments in living” (1977, 261). Conceptions of the good must 
be tested, Mill argued, by the experience we have in living with them (Anderson 
1991, 4). Along these lines, by maintaining that people are not completely identical 
in every respect, a social contract theory for a diverse world needs to generate rules 
for particular societies “to come to discover principles of justice that are best suited 
to their particular circumstances” (118). This is Muldoon’s substantial revision of 
standard social contract theory. Specifically, his argument does not produce a 
unique social contract whose suitability is motivated through a mechanism of jus-
tification. Rather, Muldoon offers a procedure for discovery where there is no par-
ticular endpoint to the process. This procedure, he thinks, is the way to develop 
social contracts that are responsive to the particular needs and wants of affected 
individuals without compromising social stability. 
 
Muldoon constructs his argument around the concept of perspective. “Each polit-
ical theory,” he writes, “is a representation of a particular perspective” (63). Per-
spectives, he continues, categorize “the world in terms of the values that the theory 
holds dear” (63). As such, perspectives shape preferences over potential political 
outcomes, and they also “determine what we see as the outcome” (63). This second 
attribute is crucial in the book. Perspectives, he says, are “the filters that we use to 
view the world” (48), mental schemata that provide a general ontology within 
which choices and evaluations are made. Muldoon’s idea is that an evaluative belief 
supported by different perspectives is stronger and that by combining perspectives, 
it is possible to find the most robust moral beliefs (chapter 3). 
 
Given such a variety of perspectives, Muldoon provides a model to determine moral 
principles we can take for granted at the beginning of the political process (chapter 
4). Central to this part of the book is the move from deliberation to bargaining. 
Muldoon argues that unlike deliberation – which, in his view, begins with an a 
priori political conception of justice – during bargaining among parties with a sim-
ilar set of constraints, each party has to be convinced on his or her own terms. In 
this situation, moral agents with different perspectives engage with one another in 
a way that does not privilege any given framework. Actually, as he goes on to say, 
by balancing the benefits and burdens of a rights distribution, each party may have 
its own perspective-dependent reason for endorsing the contract despite disagree-
ment at a more substantive level. The goal, therefore, is exactly that of individuat-
ing the set of evaluative beliefs that have the greatest number of independent lines 
of argumentation across different perspectives. This set of evaluative beliefs would 
be the starting point for the definition and re-definition of social contracts. 
 
If such a model is to sustain an experimental approach to social contracting in a 
diverse society, it remains to be demonstrated that social experimentation, and 
changes to the initial cross-perspectivally robust social contract, does not produce 
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argues, material ties can provide strong-enough reasons to keep people together. 
Diversity, in other words, is also economically beneficial. Muldoon devotes chapter 
5 to demonstrating this claim. One assumption (however debatable as it could be) 
– that the economy is productive and not a zero-sum game – supports the argu-
ment for stability. Here he combines the trial-and-error method with Ricardo’s 
idea of comparative advantage (2004): countries and people should specialise in 
what they do best. 
 
First, Muldoon argues that diversity leads to more specialisation and greater returns 
in trade. And since in complex economies we need to have many kinds of tasks 
performed and diverse problem-solving abilities, trade among diverse specialists 
increases social production and reduces labour-market competition. If each indi-
vidual can only be made better off as production (intended as the process of com-
bining inputs to make something for consumption) is made more diverse (diversity 
in production has no negative consequences), individuals have reason to want more 
diversity in production. Second, Muldoon claims that without cultural connec-
tions, diverse societies are stable insofar as they provide members with benefits 
greater than those they can find in some other social arrangement. By distributing 
the gains of uniting in a society to make sure parties are made better off than they 
would otherwise have been, parties have reasons for remaining in the society. Even-
tually, all parties, he says, have reasons to participate in a social contract that cele-
brates and encourages diversity. 
 
One of the explicit ambitions of the book is to bring the notion of perspective to 
political theory. To do so, Muldoon recalls Amartya Sen’s observation that all ma-
jor conceptions of justice have some notion of equality (Sen 2009). In other words, 
they see equality from different points of view. From this, Muldoon argues that 
“each political theory is a representation of a particular perspective” (63). This is 
fascinating, but Muldoon stops his philosophical analysis of perspectives all too 
early. From time to time, the reader has the impression that perspectives have the 
same, or nearly the same, meaning as other popular expressions in political theory, 
such as viewpoints, views, points of view, and the like. Sometimes the notion of per-
spectives does not seem to add much to the canonical vocabulary of epistemic 
arguments for diversity. Some passages of the book would have benefitted from an 
investigation into the philosophical foundations of perspectivism. For instance, I 
am curious to know why different, and perhaps contrasting, perspectives of the 
same moral object can coexist. Why are different perspectives on the origin of 
species entitled to be heard? Or why are religious extremists entitled to have a say 
about syllabuses in schools and academic institutions? Moreover, it seems im-
portant to know whether all perspectives can coexist or just a subset of all possible 
perspectives. If the latter, what defines the threshold of inclusion vs. exclusion? 
These are normative questions that have received some attention in modern phi-
losophy, from phenomenological thought all the way down to contemporary phi-
losophy of science (i.e. Conant 2005 2006; Giere 2006; Merleau-Ponty 2013). 
Without opening a dialogue with these traditions, the risk is that Muldoon’s ar-
gument will engage with only some of the epistemic arguments for diversity in 
political theory. 
 
Muldoon offers an original bargaining model which, all things considered, depends 
less than he seems to think on the notion of perspective. Muldoon assumes each 
agent is able to engage in the bargaining on her own terms. And he thinks that if 
the agent is losing more than she gains, then she will withdraw from the agree-
ment. These assumptions make things a little too easy. First, for the most margin-
alized agents, assuming a bargaining position may necessitate that they compre-
hensively re-articulate their views. Or, at least, it requires they be recognized as 
negotiators. Moreover, I am not sure it is so easy to exit revisable but still binding 
social contracts. In this regard, feminist contributions to the debate on multicul-
turalism have shown how difficult it is to exit formal and informal contracts. For 
instance, Ayelet Shacar suggests that, in the case of private religious arbitration, 
some vulnerable members of minority groups may find it particularly difficult to 
initiate judicial review over intra-group violations of human rights (2008, 598). Or, 
in many other cases, vulnerable members would have to pay a heavy social price for 
defecting otherwise-default, but informal, rules.  
 
The model, I think, would have benefitted from more critical sensitivity towards 
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equality in terms of relative bargaining power. He rightly points out that an agent’s 
bargaining power is contextual and somehow relative to the other sides of the ne-
gotiation. However, a number of other aspects determine the most favourable price 
in a negotiation, such as looks, asymmetry, reputation as a good negotiator, liabil-
ity, patience, power to make proposals, and sex. Without factoring these aspects 
into the design of the model, the risk is to provide a too idealized non-ideal social 
contract theory. 
 
Muldoon relies heavily on economic theory and on examples to show that his ac-
count has a good grasp of the reality of social relations. This makes his book very 
readable and clear. Sometimes, however, I have the impression that relying on too 
many examples cuts the complexity of philosophical reflection short. 
 
Notwithstanding my criticisms, I do not mean to deny the importance of the ar-
gument internal to the model. Muldoon brings fresh air to liberal debates on di-
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